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Abstract
Panel data from the German SOEP is used to test for risk vulnerability (RV) in the wider
population. Two different survey responses are analysed: the response to the question
about willingness-to-take risk in general and the chosen investment in a hypothetical
lottery. A convenient indicator of background risk is the VDAX index, an established
measure of volatility in the German stock market. This is used as an explanatory
variable in conjunction with HDAX, the stock market index, which proxies wealth.
The impacts of these measures on risk attitude are identifiable by exploiting the time
dimension of the panel and matching survey months with corresponding observations
from these time-varying factors. Both of the survey responses allow us to test for
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA); in one case, we find strong evidence of
DARA, while in the other, we do not. Both survey responses also allow us to test for
RV, and in both cases we find strong evidence. In the case of the hypothetical lottery
response, we are also able to estimate a “coefficient of risk vulnerability” (CRV). This
is defined as the absolute amount by which absolute risk aversion rises in response to
a doubling of background risk. We estimate CRV to be between 1.03 and 1.27.
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1 Introduction
There is much empirical evidence of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the
phenomenon of an individual becoming more willing to take risk when their wealth
increases by an absolute amount. This evidence comes from both the field (e.g. Hamal
and Anderson 1982) and the laboratory (e.g. Levy 1994). A related concept is risk
vulnerability (RV) (Gollier and Pratt 1996). This is the phenomenon of an individual
becoming less willing to take risk when mean-zero background risk (independent of
other risks) is added to their wealth.
Risk vulnerability is an important hypothesis, especially in the light of the 2008
global financial crisis, and the global recession that followed. The period of (and
immediately following) the crisis amounted to a textbook example of a period of
abnormally high background risk. It is important to understand the impact of this on
individuals’ risk attitude in order to gain greater insight into our understanding of
the overall impact of the crisis for future reference. It has been shown, for example,
that risk-vulnerable agents respond to an increase in background risk by adjusting
their portfolio in favour of safe assets and by demanding more insurance (Gollier and
Pratt 1996). Risk Vulnerability has even been put forward as an explanation for the
well-known equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985; Weil 1992).
In many theoretical studies, RV is assumed. For example, Heaton and Lucas (2000)
invoke the assumption in their explanations of portfolio puzzles. However, perhaps
surprisingly, there is comparatively little empirical evidence of RV.
Experimental evidence of RV has been found by Beaud and Willinger (2015),
Lusk and Coble (2008) and others. In this paper, we instead use survey data drawn
from the wider population. It may be argued that in the present context survey data
have considerable advantages over experimental data with regard to external validity.
Aside from the standard advantages of a larger and more representative sample, it is
reasonable to expect that measures of background risk that might be used in the context
of survey data (e.g. measures of macroeconomic uncertainty) have greater external
validity than the types of background risk typically induced in a laboratory setting.
Guiso and Paiella (2008) find evidence of RV from a cross section sample of Italian
individuals, where the chosen measure of background risk is the variance (over time)
in per-capita GDP in the individual’s province of residence. West and Worthington
(2014) estimate the impact of macroeconomic conditions on risk attitude using an
Australian panel data set. Although they do not explicitly refer to background risk
and RV, our analysis is similar to theirs in respect of exploiting a panel data set, and
introducing time-varying factors.
The panel data we use is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). This consists
of repeated data on a large number of individuals. We focus on two outcome variables.
The first is the response to the direct question about willingness to take risks in general.
This response is provided on a 0–10 Likert scale (Likert 1932). Hence, the random
effects ordered probit model is used for the analysis of this outcome. The second
outcome is the response to a hypothetical lottery investment question. An individual’s
response to this question may be taken to imply that that individual’s coefficient of
absolute risk aversion lies in a particular interval. Consequently, the random effects
interval regression model is used for the analysis of this outcome.
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In order to test for DARA and RV, we match repeated responses to these risk-
related questions in the panel, to observations (from the month immediately preceding
the survey date) on the time-varying factors, HDAX and VDAX. HDAX is the Ger-
man stock market index, which acts as a proxy for wealth, and hence, a test of the
impact of HDAX on risk attitude amounts to a test of DARA. VDAX is an estab-
lished indicator of volatility in the German stock market,1 thereby having a direct
interpretation as a measure of background risk prevailing in any given time period.
Consequently, a test of the impact of VDAX on risk attitude may be interpreted as a
test of RV.
In addition to testing for risk vulnerability in the manner described above, we will
go a step further by deducing an estimate of the “coefficient of risk vulnerability”
(CRV), which will be defined in due course. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt
at the empirical quantification of risk vulnerability.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 describes the data; Sect. 3 discusses the
modelling strategies; Sect. 4 reports and discusses the results, and also constructs an
estimate of the CRV; and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The SOEP data set
The German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP) has been running since 1984 and
surveys a cohort of approximately 20,000 households annually, inquiring into lifestyle
and economic activities (Frick et al. 2007; Jürgen and Gert 2007).2 In 2004, the survey
broadened to include the first questions associated with risk attitude.
What we will refer to as the “general risk question” was repeated biennially until
2008 after which it was asked annually, with the last observation considered in the
research being in 2012. The “general risk question” is given by:
How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to
take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale,
where 0 means “risk averse” and the value 10 means “fully prepared to take
risks”
          
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
For the sake of homogeneity, we consider head-of-households only. The resulting
sample consists of 11,903 individuals observed an average of 3.68 times each. His-
tograms of the general risk response for each year separately are presented in Fig. 1.
The most interesting feature of these histograms is the changing shape of the distri-
bution of responses between years. In 2004 and 2006, it appears that the distribution
1 More specifically, the VDAX represents the expected volatility of the DAX index in the next 30 days.
The equivalent of VDAX in the US stock market is the well-known VIX, which is also known as the “fear
index”.
2 For details of the target population, the sampling strategy, and the methods of ensuring representativeness,
see: https://soep.readthedocs.io/en/latest/overview/sample.html.
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Fig. 1 Distribution of self-reported risk attitude (household head)
is fairly symmetric around the midpoint of 5, roughly implying risk neutrality. In
2008, 2009, and 2010, however, there is a definite sense that the distribution is more
concentrated on the lower half, implying a tendency to risk aversion. These years, of
course, correspond to the global recession which followed the 2008 global financial
crisis. The asymmetry is seen most clearly in 2009, and this is not surprising since
2009 is considered to be the nadir of the crisis. In 2011 and 2012, we see an appar-
ent return to symmetry, and the distribution for 2012 appears surprisingly similar to
the pre-crisis distributions seen in 2004 and 2006. Since the impact of the crisis on
the response is exactly the sort of effect in which we are most interested, repeated
responses over this particular set of years appear ideal for testing the hypothesis of
RV.
Data on responses to the general risk question forms the focus of our first model
described in Sect. 3.1 below.
The second question that is of interest to us is the “hypothetical lottery question”.
The question takes the following form:
Imagine that you have won e100,000 in the lottery. Immediately after receiving
your winnings you receive the following offer: You have the chance to double your
money. But it is equally possible that you will lose half the amount invested. You
can participate by staking all or part of youre100,000 on the lottery, or choose
not to participate at all. What portion of your lottery winnings are you prepared
to stake on this financially risky, yet potentially lucrative lottery investment?
e100,000 (i.e. all of it);
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Fig. 2 Distribution of response to hypothetical lottery question
e80,000;
e60,000;
e40,000;
e20,000;
Nothing: I would decline the offer
The hypothetical lottery question was asked only twice, in 2004 and in 2009. His-
tograms of responses for these two years are shown in Fig. 2. Again it is illuminating
to compare the histograms between years. In both cases, we see a mode at the choice
of a zero investment, implying risk aversion. However, this mode appears much more
prominent in 2009 than in 2004, and again it is reasonable to hypothesize that this is
a consequence of 2009 coinciding with the nadir of the global recession that followed
the financial crisis.
Data on responses to the hypothetical lottery question form the focus of our second
model which is described in Sect. 3.2. The Spearman correlation coefficient between
the two responses (self-reported risk attitude and investment in hypothetical lottery) is
+ 0.2596, with a p-value of 0.0000. The implied consistency between the two responses
is a useful basis for data validation.
From the SOEP data, we also extract a number of demographic variables which are
used as explanatory variables in the two models.3 These include age, gender, marital
3 Demographic variables are obtained from the longitudinal SOEPv29 files: SO E P pl_en and SO E P
pequiv_en.
123
P. M. Bacon et al.
Fig. 3 HDAX, Stock market index (left panel), and VDAX, Stock market volatility (right panel), over time.
Source: datastream. Solid sections of the lines represent periods in which data on responses to the general
risk question are available; the shaded vertical bars represent the periods in which the hypothetical lottery
question was asked
status, and years of education. Descriptive statistics of all variables used, along with
SOEP dataset codes, are supplied in Table 4 of the Appendix.
As mentioned in Sect. 1, the financial variables we use are the German stock market
index (HDAX) and the German stock market volatility index (VDAX).4 The former
may be considered a suitable proxy for wealth, while the latter is a proxy for the
prevailing level of background risk.5 In Fig. 3, we present time series plots of these
two variables (HDAX, left panel, and VDAX, right panel). The solid sections of
the lines represent years in which data on responses to the general risk question are
available; the shaded bars represent periods in which the hypothetical lottery question
was asked. The most important features of these plots are the steep fall in HDAX and
the even steeper rise in VDAX that coincide with the onset of the global financial
crisis in 2008.
Linking together the observations made from the two time series graphs (Fig. 3)
with those from the two histograms of response data (Figs. 1, 2) leads directly to
the two testable hypotheses that are the focus of this paper. A positive effect of
HDAX on willingness to take risk (or a negative effect on absolute risk aversion)
will amount to evidence of DARA. A negative effect of VDAX on willingness to
take risk (or a positive effect on absolute risk aversion) will amount to evidence of
RV.
3 Modelling strategies
In this section, we shall develop modelling strategies for the responses to the two
risk-related survey questions presented and discussed in Sect. 2.
4 Monthly data on HDAX and VDAX are obtained from Datastream.
5 We refer to VDAX as a proxy for background risk, because clearly not all individuals hold their wealth in
the form of common stock, on which VDAX is based. We nevertheless consider it to be a useful proxy on
the basis that it captures the level of uncertainty in the macroeconomy as generally perceived by economic
agents.
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3.1 General risk attitude: model 1
For responses to the general risk question, we shall use the random effects ordered
probit model, which is outlined as follows.6 Let i index respondent, i = 1, . . . , n,
and let t index time period, t = 1, . . . , T . Let yit be respondent i’s response to the
general risk question about risk taking in period t , and assume that this can take one of
the integer values 1, 2, 3, . . . , J . Let y∗i t (−∞ < y∗i t < +∞) be the underlying latent
variable representing respondent i’s propensity to risk taking in period t . Let xit be a
vector of characteristics relevant in explaining the risk attitude of respondent i at time
t . Let zt be a vector of financial variables. The random effects ordered probit model
is based on the assumption that y∗i t depends linearly on xit and zt , according to:
y∗i t = x ′i tβ + z′tγ + ui + i t
ui ∼ N (0, σ 2u ), i t ∼ N (0, 1) i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . T . (1)
β and γ are vectors of parameters; neither contains an intercept. There are two stochas-
tic terms: the individual-specific term ui and the random error term i t . Note that these
are both assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero; the variance of ui is a
free parameter, while the variance of i t is, for identification, normalized to 1. This
normalization is required in order to set the otherwise arbitrary scale of the latent
variable y∗. The latent variable y∗ is linked to the observed variable y via a set of
J − 1 cut-point parameters, which are estimated along with the other parameters.
We will be particularly interested in the elements of γ . The parameter estimate
associated with HDAX (resp. VDAX) will enable us to test DARA (resp. RV).
3.2 The hypothetical lottery question: Model 2
For responses to the hypothetical lottery question, we shall use the random effects
interval regression model, which is outlined as follows.7
We will assume that each individual has the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) utility function:
U (x) = 1 − exp (−r x) − ∞ < r < ∞; x > 0 (2)
so that the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion is r . Recall from Sect. 2 that
the hypothetical lottery question requires respondents to choose one of six possible
“investments” in a particular lottery.8 It is easily established using (2) that (assuming
6 For further details of the random effects ordered probit model, see Greene and Hensher (2010, chapter
9). Maximum likelihood estimation of its parameters may be obtained using the xtoprobit command
available in STATA (StataCorp 2017).
7 The interval regression approach is similar in many ways to the ordered probit approach outlined in
Sect. 3.1. One important difference is that in the former, the cut-points defining the intervals are known
numbers, while in the latter, the cut-points are unknown and are therefore parameters to be estimated.
8 Please refer back to Sect. 2 for a description of the lottery.
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Table 1 Ranges of coefficient of
absolute risk aversion (r )
implied by different investment
choices in hypothetical lottery
question, assuming expected
utility maximization
Investment r Lower r Upper
e100,000 −∞ 0.50
e80,000 0.50 0.70
e60,000 0.70 0.95
e40,000 0.95 1.50
e20,000 1.50 4.70
e0 4.70 ∞
expected utility maximization) each of the six possible investment choices implies a
range for r , and the limits of these ranges are presented in Table 1.9
As in Sect. 3.1, let i index respondent, i = 1,. . . , n, and let t index time period,
t = 1, . . . , T . For respondent i in period t let yit be the investment choice and let rit
be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Since observations on yit imply intervals
for rit , we model the variable rit as follows.
rit = x ′i tβ + z′tγ + ui + i t i = 1, . . . , n; t = 1, . . . , T
ui ∼ N
(
0, σ 2u
)
; i t ∼ N
(
0, σ 2
)
(3)
The relationship between the observed investment choice yit and the (latent) risk
attitude variable rit is (using the values from Table 1):
yit = 100, 000 ⇒ −∞ < rit ≤ 0.50
yit = 80, 000 ⇒ 0.50 < rit ≤ 0.70
yit = 60, 000 ⇒ 0.70 < rit ≤ 0.95
yit = 40, 000 ⇒ 0.95 < rit ≤ 1.50
yit = 20, 000 ⇒ 1.50 < rit ≤ 4.70
yit = 0 ⇒ 4.70 < rit ≤ ∞ (4)
(3) and (4) together define the random effects interval regression model whose param-
eters may be estimated using Maximum likelihood.10
With reference to (3), the risk attitude for respondent i at time t , rit , depends on the
respondent’s characteristics, contained in xit , and also on financial variables as per-
taining at time t , contained in zt . Once again, we are interested in the elements of γ .
In particular, let γv be the coefficient associated with the logarithm of our background
9 To understand where the numbers in Table 1 come from, consider the first row. For simplicity, let us
measure money amounts in units of e100,000. If a respondent indicates that they would invest the entire
e100,000, they are opting for a 50:50 gamble between 0.5 units and 2 units, and the expected utility
of this gamble is 1 − 0.5 exp(−0.5r) − 0.5 exp(−2r). If they instead chose the next riskiest investment
of e80,000, they are opting for a 50:50 gamble between 0.6 units and 1.8 units, with expected utility
1 − 0.5 exp(−0.6r) − 0.5 exp(−1.8r). The value of r that equalizes these two expected utilities is 0.50.
Hence, anyone whose CARA parameter is less than 0.50 will investe100,000, while anyone whose CARA
is greater than 0.50 will invest a smaller amount. This explains the upper limit of 0.50 appearing in the first
row of Table 1. Numbers appearing in other rows are obtained using similar reasoning.
10 Using the xtintreg command in STATA (StataCorp 2017).
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risk measure, VDAX. If we define the coefficient of risk vulnerability (CRV) to be
the absolute change in absolute risk aversion resulting from a doubling of background
risk, then11
CRV = γv log(2) (5)
An estimate of CRV, defined in (5), will be obtained in the next section.
4 Results
In this section, estimation results are presented and discussed.
4.1 Testing for risk vulnerability using self-reported risk attitude
In Table 2, we present results from the application of the random effects ordered probit
model, described in Sect. 3.1, to panel data on self-reported willingness to take (gen-
eral) risk. Model 1 in Table 2 explains the response purely in terms of demographic
characteristics of the individual, and the effect of each of these variables is strongly sig-
nificant. In particular, we see a greater propensity to take risks by younger, more highly-
educated, unmarried, males. These findings are in agreement with previous research
using the same data source on the determinants of risk attitude (Dohmen et al. 2011).
Model 2 in Table 2 includes an income/wealth variable in the form of the logarithm
of income from asset flows. This variable has a strongly positive effect on the propen-
sity to take risk, and this result is consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion
(DARA).
Model 3 in Table 2 includes the two financial variables log(HDAX)−1 and
log(VDAX)−1, respectively, the logarithm of the two indices HDAX and VDAX in
the month previous to the month of the interview.12 As explained previously, HDAX
is included to capture the effect of changes in wealth, while VDAX captures the effect
of changes in background risk. The strongly positive coefficient on HDAX therefore
amounts to further evidence of DARA. The strongly negative effect of VDAX indi-
cates that individuals are less willing to take risks at times when the stock market is
more volatile. Treating stock market volatility as a measure of background risk, this
result may be interpreted as strong evidence of risk vulnerability (RV).
Finally, Model 4 includes some additional variables, y and y2, which represent a
year trend and a squared year trend, and year-specific month-trends (i.e. variables that
take the value 1 in January, 2 in February, and so on for a specific year) and their square.
The inclusion of these variables is motivated by concern that the two variables of cen-
tral attention, HDAX and VDAX, are by their time series nature, fixed within a month.
Consequently, all respondents interviewed in a particular month have the same values
11 To understand (5), assume that r = α + β log v and suppose that v doubles from v to 2v. Before this
change, the value of r is α + β log v and after the change it is α + β log 2v = α + β ln v + β log 2. The
change in r resulting from the doubling of v is therefore β log 2.
12 Note that since the two indices HDAX and VDAX are observed at the end of each month, it is logical
to use the previous month’s values as the basis for decisions in the current month.
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Table 2 Random effects ordered probit results (cut-points estimates not reported)
General risk Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Male 0.488∗ ∗ ∗ 0.485∗ ∗ ∗ 0.489∗ ∗ ∗ 0.488∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0167)
Married − 0.0671∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0750∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0776∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0806∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Age − 0.0186∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0189∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0185∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.0179∗ ∗ ∗
(0.000445) (0.000447) (0.000461) (0.00047)
# Years of education 0.0312∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0288∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0301∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0316∗ ∗ ∗
(0.00254) (0.00259) (0.00263) (0.00265)
Log (income asset flows) 0.00965∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0102∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0104∗ ∗ ∗
(0.00202) (0.00204) (0.00205)
Log (HDAX)−1 0.0589∗∗ 0.3113∗∗
(0.0223) (0.1221)
Log (VDAX)−1 − 0.646∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.272∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0148) (0.0515)
y − 0.298∗ ∗ ∗
(0.037)
y2 0.0272∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0034)
Linear and quadratic No No No Yes
Year-specific month-trends
σu 0.937∗ ∗ ∗ 0.936∗ ∗ ∗ 0.959∗ ∗ ∗ 0.963∗ ∗ ∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
n 21,911 21,911 21,911 21,911
T (mean of) 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
Log-likelihood −162,823.46 −162,812.08 −161,566.44 − 160, 906.79
Dep. var.: Willingness to take risks (Likert scale 0–10, over 2004–2012)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
for each of these variables. This may be viewed as a version of the classic Moulton prob-
lem (1986). The standard solution to this problem is to allow “cluster-specific” effects.
Since the clusters in this case are time periods, including year trends and year-specific
month-trends allows for the required month effects in a way that also allows for time
series structure of the data. Although this causes some coefficients to change in value
from Model 3, the key conclusions (in particular strong evidence of RV) do not change.
4.2 Testing for risk vulnerability using hypothetical lottery choice
We now turn to the results from estimating Eq. (3) using the random effects interval
regression model, as explained in Sect. 3.2. Recall that the underlying latent variable
in this model is the respondent’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Hence we expect
the coefficient estimates in this model to be of opposite signs to the corresponding
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Table 3 Random effects interval regression using investment choices in hypothetical lottery
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Male − 0.877∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.8412∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.7926∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0664) (0.0660) (0.0656)
Married 01383∗ 0.2699∗ ∗ ∗ 0.3150∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0641) (0.0647) (0.0641)
Age 0.0492∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0528∗ ∗ ∗ 0.0477∗ ∗ ∗
(0.00194) (0.00196) (0.0020)
# Years of education − 0.1607∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.125∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.1346∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Log (income asset flows) − 0.1424∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.1357∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0114) (0.0113)
Log (HDAX)−1 2.8234∗ ∗ ∗
(0.3402)
Log (VDAX)−1 1.6557∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0902)
Constant 6.1296∗ ∗ ∗ 6.129∗ ∗ ∗ − 20.6948∗ ∗ ∗
(0.166) (0.1664) (2.5200)
σu 1.8957∗ ∗ ∗ 1.857∗ ∗ ∗ 1.953∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0532)
σe 2.997∗ ∗ ∗ 2.998∗ ∗ ∗ 2.862∗ ∗ ∗
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0287)
n 23,448 23,448 23,488
T (mean of) 1.5 1.5 1.5
Log-likelihood − 26, 620.072 − 26, 541.034 − 26, 246.513
Dep. var.: Coefficient of absolute risk aversion (r )
left censored = 340; right censored = 15,973; interval = 7126.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
estimates reported in Table 2 (since the latent variable underlying that model was
willingness to take risk).
The results of the random effects interval regression model are reported in Table 3.
Again we start with a base specification (Model 1) in which only characteristics of the
respondent are included. The signs of each of these effects are consistent with those
in Table 2 and with results elsewhere in the literature.
The second specification (Model 2) is one which includes a measure of individual
wealth, in the form of the logarithm of income from assets. As expected, this has a
strongly negative effect, implying decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
Finally, Model 3 includes the two financial variables log(HDAX)−1 and
log(VDAX)−1. Log(HDAX)−1 appears to have a strongly positive effect on risk aver-
sion. This can only be seen as an unexpected result. Given the role of HDAX as a
proxy for wealth, decreasing absolute risk aversion leads to the prediction that the
coefficient of log(HDAX)−1 in this model will be negative. However, note that the
coefficient of asset income is still strongly negative, suggesting that asset income is
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successfully performing the role of a wealth proxy, while we must look elsewhere for
the source of the positive effect of HDAX.13
Once again the coefficient of log(VDAX)−1 is consistent with the hypothesis of
risk vulnerability: Log(VDAX)−1 has a strongly positive effect on risk aversion. If
we apply (5) to the coefficient of + 1.66, we obtain a coefficient of risk vulnerability
(CRV) of + 1.15, with a 95% confidence interval of (1.03,1.27).14 The point estimate
is interpreted as follows. If background risk doubles, as it appeared to do at the onset
of the global financial crisis (see Fig. 3, right panel), a typical agent’s coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is expected to rise by an amount 1.15.
5 Conclusion
We have used two very different survey questions from the German SOEP to test for
risk vulnerability (RV). The first is self-reported risk attitude, and the second is invest-
ment choice in a hypothetical lottery. We applied a nonparametric test to establish
that the two measures have a positive association in the sample. Analysis of the two
outcomes has called for the use of two different econometric models: random effects
ordered probit and random effects interval regression. Our chosen measure of back-
ground risk is the VDAX, which represents the level of volatility in the German stock
market. In both estimations, the effect of this variable is strongly significant with a
sign consistent with RV.
Given our objective of testing RV, it has been particularly useful to have used data
from a time period (2004–2012) that includes what is now widely recognized to be a
period of higher-than-normal background risk, the 2008 global financial crisis.
We have defined a coefficient of risk vulnerability (CRV) that can be estimated
empirically, and we are not aware of any previous attempts to quantify RV. Using the
hypothetical lottery choice data, we have obtained an estimate of CRV of 1.15. The
95 % confidence interval for CRV of (1.03, 1.27), being far from zero and reasonably
narrow, indicates firstly that a typical agent does indeed display RV, and secondly that
CRV is being estimated with admirable precision.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix: Summary statistics
See Table 4.
13 In order to address the Moulton problem, we have used an approach similar to the one explained in the
previous section. However, in this case, none of year-specific month-trends improved the fit with respect to
Model 3. The results are available from the authors on request.
14 The 95% confidence interval is obtained as the point estimate ±1.96 standard errors. In accordance with
(5), the standard error of the estimate of CRV is simply obtained by multiplying the relevant standard error
from Table 3 by ln(2).
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